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ABSTRACT
The literature on political business cycles (PBC) suggests that incumbent governments
manipulate the economy for political reasons, in particular for winning elections.
Accordingly, it is argued that incumbent governments manipulate the economy to create
better economic conditions in the pre-election period with declining unemployment and
increasing growth rates of the economy and inflation to enhance the likelihood of re-
election.  The theory suggests that post-election periods experience contraction in the
economy to offset the adverse impact of expansionary policy in the pre-election period.
The main argument is that due to the myopic nature of individual voters and their
retrospective voting attitudes, governments can manipulate the economy to create such
conditions to increase their popularity.  The theoretical model of this opportunistic PBC
is based on Nordhaus theoretic (1975).
This study aims to investigate the existence of PBC in Turkey by modelling fiscal and
monetary policy instruments within traditional opportunistic Nordhausian theoretic.
The econometric analysis is based on Nordhaus theoretic with exogenously determined
elections.  The fiscal and monetary policy instruments are modelled within intervention
analysis with quarterly data for the 1980-2002 and 1986-2002 periods.  The econometric
time-series analysis provided unequivocally strong evidence for the presence of PBC in
fiscal and monetary policy instruments in Turkey.
In light of the evidence yielded, the presence of politically-manufactured fiscal and
monetary policy cycles has been established in the case of Turkey (mainly) in the period
1980-2002.  This implies that incumbent governments in Turkey have used elections to
create PBC in their attempts to buy votes for winning elections or to enhance their chances
of re-election.  The research, hence, vindicates the Nordhausian theoretic or model in the
case of a developing country, namely in Turkey.
Keywords: Political business cycles, opportunistic business cycles, Nordhaus model,
elections, fiscal and monetary policies, autoregression analysis, time series analysis,
Turkey.
JEL Classification: D72; E5; E6; H2; H3
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“In Turkey, as elsewhere, political imperatives generally dominate
economic imperatives, which presents the government with a
fundamental dilemma.”
 Önis & Riedel (1993: 2)
“The nature of electoral competition [in Turkey] was some degree
responsible for the build up of macroeconomic instability”
Önis (1997: 43)
“It seemed, in fact, that Turkey’s most serious economic problem
was actually political and that it would remain with her for may
years to come...”
Hale (1981: 261)
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in political economics and public choice have led to a fresh
understanding of the mutual interaction between the economy and politics.  As a result,
the interaction between macroeconomic developments and political events has been the
subject of a number of econometric and theoretical studies.   One of the most attractive
research areas has been the modelling of the interaction between polity and economy, or
political business cycles (henceforth ‘PBC’).  PBC implies that governments as self-
maximising units attempt to stir the economy in favour of increasing their popularity so
that they can remain in government through re-election.  It is indeed assumed that
economic events do affect political events and vice-versa.
The empirical studies on the interaction between politics and economics have focused on
two issues; the extent to which economic conditions affect voter behaviour and the
degree to which the political environment affects the government’s economic policies.
In modelling these, some restrictive assumptions have been made by researchers.  As a
result some of the research has successfully demonstrated the existence of politically
motivated business cycles.  However others, by assuming different assumptions and
hypotheses, have proved otherwise.
Although it is true that there are a number of empirical studies on developing countries,
it is a fact that a very large part of the PBC empirical works have focused on western
democracies.  While it is true that there are empirical and data related constraints, the
very nature of politics, namely the non-existence of liberal democracies, in most of the
developing world may have been seen as a major institutional and theoretical constraint.
This paper is attempts to search for the presence of PBC in Turkey, which is a
developing country in terms of its economy and importantly in terms of its democracy.
Despite the real nature and consequences of its institutions, it is a fact that democratic
institutions do exist and functions in Turkey.  The existence of multi-party politics within
its democratic framework paves the way for the political manipulation of the economy,
which is modelled and empirically searched in the following sections.
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1.2. NORDHAUS THEORETIC OF PBC MODEL
Nordhaus’ model of politico-economic interaction paved the way to the publication of
many, theoretical and empirical studies.  It remains one of the seminal works in the
empirical construction of PBC literature.
Among the traditional opportunistic models, in particular the PBC model developed by
Nordhaus (1975), it is suggested that opportunistic governments pursue policies for
manipulating the economy for political purposes over the course of their entire term in
government.  In other words, Nordhaus’ (1975) study provides a PBC model in which
governments always engage in creating PBC during their terms in office, and as a result
politically-oriented business cycles become perpetuated processes, and this provides
unintended support to the Marxist explanation of business cycles in a capitalist
environment.  Due to such structural features, the Nordhaus theoretic can be utilised to
qualify PBC prior to elections, in addition to capturing PBC during the entire term of a
government.
Nordhaus limits the application of his study to democratic countries, which hold regular
elections for political office, namely government.  In his model, he implicitly brings an
organic understanding of the state into the framework by ignoring the social welfare
function when he assumes that in a democratic society’s political framework the
economic policies of the incumbent governments are targeted to win the elections.
Thus, he constructs his model along ‘rational’ lines, but also an opportunistic traditional
point of reference.  In other words, he assumes the rational nature of market behaviour
in polity within traditional political business cycle assumptions.
1.2.1. Assumptions of the Nordhaus Theoretic
The assumptions of the Nordhaus Theoretic or Model can best be explained by the
frameworks presented by Alesina et al (1991: 3-4), Alesina and Roubini (1992: 665),
Alesina et al (1993: 4-5), and Alesina et al (1997: 17-22).
i. The economy can be described by an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve
Like other models of PBC, Nordhaus forms his model on the Phillips Curve
macroeconomic trade-off between inflation and unemployment.  However, Nordhaus
utilises the expectations-augmented version of the Phillips Curve.
ii. Voters are retrospective and myopic
The model assumes that when voters cast their vote they judge the incumbent
government by evaluating positively high growth, low unemployment and low inflation,
but by heavily discounting past observations.
iii. Expectations of the voters are adaptive
Nordhaus (1975: 174) assumes that the behaviour of voters in forming their expectations
is ‘adaptive’, and hence their expectations of the performance of government or the
prospect of the economy are formed adaptively.  This implies that in forming their
expectations for economic policies, individuals utilise the past actual values and the most
recent actual values of economic variables as an index for government performance.
Thus, individual voters are retrospective.
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iv. Politicians are opportunistic
The self-interest of the politicians is dominated by the sole objective of remaining in the
office.  By establishing an analogy between market and polity, the behaviour of politicians
is perceived as “rational behaviour” (Nordhaus, 1975: 174).  As a result of such
rationality, politicians attempt to manipulate economic policies to ensure their re-election.
Manipulating the economy through contractionary and expansionary economic policies,
as discussed above, provide the government with a better chance of being re-elected.
v. Politicians control a policy instrument
To be able to manipulate the public during an election through the use of fiscal and
monetary policies, such policies should have direct impact on the individuals.  This can
happen when such policies alter aggregate demand, as predicted by Keynesian economic
theory.  As Alesina et al (1991: 3-4; and 1993: 4-5) argue “politicians control a policy
instrument which directly effects aggregate demand”.
vi. The timing of elections is exogenously fixed
The issue surrounding the timing of elections is not entirely an unambiguous issue.
Alesina et al (1991 and 1993) and Alesina and Roubini (1992) suggest that Nordhaus’
model is based on exogenously determined election timing.  However, this assumption
has to be modified to fit the election determination style of each country for which the
model is applied.  In most of the other countries including the European democracies,
other than the USA, the election date is not fixed, thus endogenously set as incumbent
governments have the advantage of determining the timing of the election within
constitutional limits.  As a result, endogenously set election dates as a strategy facilitates
the possible return of the incumbent government into office after the election.
1.2.2. Modelling Endogenously Set Election Dates
Nordhaus (1975) does not distinguish endogenous and exogenous election timing, and
provides empirical evidence for both cases in investigating the presence of PBC in
various countries.  However, the way the election date is set may have a deterministic
effect on the predictability of the model.
Some studies, for instance Nordhaus (1975), Paldam (1979 and 1983) and Soh (1986),
attempt to investigate the Nordhaus model in various cases without making the setting of
the election date as a particular issue.  However, other studies are convinced that such a
difference should be distinguished and taken into account.  Such critical studies extend
analysis of the model to see if estimating the model according to the way the election
date is set makes any difference.  They further suggest that the failure of the model could
in some cases be attributed to the fact that such a differentiation was not considered.
Lachler (1982) argues that where there is no imposition by the constitution to hold
elections by a fixed date, elections can be called earlier than normally scheduled due to
either the opportunistic nature of politics or due to other political reasons.  In addition to
political and social reasons, parliament can be dissolved when the incumbent government
calls for an election.  In such a case, only the government would know the expected date
of the election.  This implies that in those countries with such constitutional provisions,
governments are endowed with an important instrument to determine the date of an
election to coincide with the period when their performance in the economy is improved.
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As a result, governments strategically call for early elections, particularly in periods of
better economic conditions for election profiteering.  Consequently, as Lachler (1982)
suggests, under such circumstances politically created business cycles are a reality and are
more evident in terms of strength and uniformity.  Ginsburgh and Michel (1983) relate
such an outcome to the uncertainty about the term a party remains in government.
Because they argue that under conditions of incumbent uncertainties, politically-
motivated business cycles would be less visible or less evident.  In other words, when a
government does not feel comfortable in the new term, as there might be some
uncertainties such as having a fragile majority and hence calling elections much earlier
than it is legislated for, then the economy will not be contracted after the election,
although it is expanded before the election to create a myopic environment for election
profiteering.  Under such circumstances, a government may wish to remain popular to
insure itself against such uncertainty.   It should be stated that such a consequence
contradicts Nordhaus’ predictions, or at best is not considered by Nordhaus.
Among other studies, Ito (1990) introduced endogenously determined election timing
into the Nordhaus model.  According to his modification, an incumbent government
would call an election or unscheduled election only when the state of the economy is in
its favour, or when growth is high.  Therefore, he defines the probability of calling an
early election as an increasing function of high economic growth.  However, by taking
into account the above-mentioned assumption, related to the limitation of the
government in manipulating the economy, the importance of economic performance of
the private sector is introduced to the model, as due to the uncertainty created by the
endogenously fixed election date, the government cannot manipulate the economy with
certainty.  In other words, “[t]he incumbent government does not manipulate the
economy, but waits for positive non-government sector supply shocks (high growth, low
inflation) to call an election” (Ito and Park, 1988: 234).  Ito and Park (1988: 234) name
this as “opportunistic cabinet hypothesis”, or OCH.  It is obvious that the predictions of
the OCH differ from the predications of the traditional Nordhaus model.
Ito and Park (1988) introduce non-economic reasons for unscheduled elections, such as
the time elapsed since the last election (TSLE).  Since governments are bound by
constitutional terms, when the entire government term elapses, elections must take place.
However, when elections get closer, the possibility of catching better economic
conditions, or high economic growth, declines.  Therefore, against such uncertainty,
governments call unscheduled elections whenever the economy is strong within the
terms of the incumbent government by taking into account the fact that delaying
elections reduces the probability of finding better economic conditions.  They name this
“manipulative cabinet hypothesis” (MCH), which hypothesises that election timing is
determined by non-economic reasons, and governments use policy instruments to
manipulate the economy prior to elections in the parliamentary system.  Thus, MCH is
an extended Nordhaus model with endogenous election timing.
With regards to Turkey, the Turkish constitution does not impose a fixed time for an
election but requires elections to be held every five years after an election.  However, the
constitution provides the incumbent government with the right to call for an early
election.  This provides a golden opportunity for governments to determine the election
date, and hence choose the best possible period represented by low unemployment and
high aggregate demand.  The use of such constitutional provision is very much obvious
in the election dates of Turkish political history, which indicate that Turkish governments
have yet to complete their entire term, as they call early elections either after four years or
even before.
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1.3. EMPIRICAL MODELLING AND SPECIFICATIONS
Since political manipulation of fiscal and monetary instruments can be treated as
intervention which yields cyclical shifts in the mean value of the time-series data of the
particular fiscal and monetary policy variable, it is reasonable to model the opportunistic
political business cycles within intervention analysis.  For this, Box-Tiao Intervention
Analysis (Box-Tiao, 1975) is utilised which, in the case of this research, aims to search if
the elections can render additional explanations in the relevant fiscal and monetary
policy/and instrument time-series (Beck, 1982 and 1987).  Thus, the model attributes to
the changes in the policy variables from its course to the elections.
1.3.1. Capturing the Impact of Elections
Following the literature, dummy variables are created to capture the impact of elections
on fiscal and monetary policy and their instruments.  Two types of electoral dummy
variables were designed.  Initially, to gauge the significance of general elections on the
macroeconomic variables standard electoral dummy variables were used.  The survey of
the literature indicates that regardless of the way the election date is determined, these
standard dummy variables are used.  Therefore, although an election date is determined
exogenously in Turkey, or are unscheduled, the election dummy variables are adapted by
this study in light of above statement.
These standard electoral dummy variables and their definitions are as follows:
ED1 = 1 in the election quarter
= 0 otherwise
ED2 = 1 in one quarter prior to an election and the election quarter
= 0 otherwise
ED3 = 1 in two quarters prior to an election and election quarter
= 0 otherwise
ED4 = 1 in three quarters prior to an election and election quarter
= 0 otherwise
ED5 = 1 in three quarters after an election
= 0 otherwise
With regards to the expected signs of the election variables, it is expected that the pre-
election variables, ED1, ED2, ED3, and ED4, should have positive signs to imply the
impact of elections in terms of increased levels of the policy instrument.  However, post-
election variable ED5 indicates otherwise, to signify the contraction of the economy in
the post-election period.  It should however be noted that in the case of inflation, pre-
electoral variables should denote decreases and hence should have negative signs, while
the post-election variable should have a positive sign to reflect pre-election expansionary
policies.
Although these election variables represent intervention, they do not take into account the
timing of elections, as mentioned, which is an issue for this study.  Since the election
dates are not fixed in Turkey by the Constitution, this implies that in the case of Turkey,
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the electoral cycles in the fiscal and monetary policy and instruments cannot be convex
or U-shaped as stated by Nordhaus (1975).  This is consistent with Nordhaus’ own
statement, which suggests that in countries with endogenously determined election dates,
the shape of the electoral policy cycles would not be U-or reverse U-shaped.
In Turkey, elections are normally unscheduled and, thus, called earlier than the five years
due date implies that there is uncertainty about the election dates, which will only be
known by the incumbent government in light of the developments in economy and
politics.  A further implication of this uncertainty is that the incumbent government
would face uncertainty until they have some sort of idea when the best time would be for
them to hold elections.  Therefore, this imposes a constraint on the incumbent
government to manipulate the economy as it may wish to do. As a result, such
uncertainty prevents the incumbent government from manipulating the fiscal and
monetary variables over the entire election period, but probably limit it with the
campaign period, which is the period from the dissolution of parliament and the actual
election date, namely three months.  As a result, U-shaped or convex electoral business
cycles over the fiscal and monetary policies cannot be created, incumbent governments
know the exact date of the election on which they can actually hold elections.  Otherwise,
they may end up in the wrong sections or timing of the opportunistic political business
cycles.  Therefore, in addition to the official three-month period, arbitrarily attributing
another nine months, hence a total of one year should provide a reasonable period for
the government to initiate opportunistic policy cycles to boost its chance of re-election.
It should be noted that this is not necessarily an arbitrary decision, but the observation
would prove that around 10-12 months before the election the first signs of
manipulation commence, such as the increase in the wages of public sector workers, a
rise in agricultural purchasing prices, and the delay of the non-inevitable price increases
of the State Economic Enterprises (SES).
Despite not demonstrating the U-shape, the electoral dummy variables defined for this
study are expected to locate the impact of elections on fiscal and monetary policies and
instruments, and are thus expected to fulfil the original Nordhausian predictions.
However, following Ito and Park (1988: 236), Ito (1990: 150) and others, two more
dummy variables are included to analyse the full impact of the elections on
macroeconomic variables: TSLE and PREL.  By taking into account exogenously
determined elections, these additional electoral dummy variables prevent the occurrence
of the simultaneity problem, which may come into existence as a result of having timings
of elections to impact the manipulation of the economy.  In addition, these election
variables define the possible election oriented policy cycle shapes in countries where
election dates are exogenously determined.  These additional electoral dummy variables
are defined as follow:
TSLE refers to the time elapsed since last election.  Thus, from one election to another each
quarter is counted from 1 to the election quarter of the following election.  TSLE implies
that the higher the number of quarters, the higher is the government’s motivation
towards the manipulation of the economy, as higher quarters imply that election time is
approaching.  Figure 1. depicts the TSLE for the general parliamentary elections for
1980Q1 and 2003Q3, where it can be seen that maximum points refers to elections.
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Figure 1.  Trend in the Election Variable TSLE
Note: Red colour marked points stands for election quarters
PREL denotes the “post probability distribution of elections as a function of TSLE”
(Ito, 1990: 150).  It is constructed as the fitted value of the Probit estimation of elections
as a function of TSLE. It should be added that it is assumed that the voters are aware of
the PREL.  It implies the impact of the probability of the approaching elections on the
fiscal and monetary policy instruments.  Figure 2. demonstrates PREL for the 1980M1 to
2003M3, where each maximum points indicates an election.
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Figure 2. Trend in PREL, Probability Distribution of Elections
Note: Red colour marked points stands for election quarters
The additional election variables, TSEL and PREL, establish correlation between the
time period of the elections and the level of, for instance, government expenditure.
Positive sign and t-test significance would mean that the lesser the quarters between the
elections, the higher the probability of a general election to be held and hence higher the
government expenditure would be.
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1.3.2. Econometric Modelling
Recent developments in time-series econometrics have yielded significant implications
for econometrics application.  The starting point of this is the robustness of the OLS
estimates, as due to the econometrics time series properties of macroeconomic data the
OLS estimates may yield spurious regression (Granger and Newbold, 1974).  The reason for
this is the trends inherent in economic variables, as most of the macroeconomic time-
series follow a long-run trend (Price, 1998).  The implication of this would be the
invalidity of the significance test applied on OLS estimates.
In overcoming non-stationary in the econometric time series, the unit root test is
suggested.  To determine if each of the econometric time series to be used by this study
has stationarity, first the natural logarithm of each variable is established to investigate if
the variable contains any deterministic time-trend.  The graphical depiction of each of the
variables indicates a deterministic time-trend.
Following the method suggested by Enders (1995: 179), to remove the deterministic
polynomial time-trends, each variable was regressed on a constant and on a polynomial
time trend.  The appropriate polynomial time trend is determined by checking the t-test
in each regression.  The process of de-trending or the appropriate level of polynomial
time-trend for each of the variable or policy instrument is depicted in table 1 in the
appendix section.
For the quarterly data the next step is to eliminate the impact of seasons, namely the
time-series need to be seasonally-adjusted.  The trend-adjusted time series are seasonally
adjusted by following the conventional method of regressing each variable on a constant
and three quarterly dummies by taking the last quarter as the reference quarter (Gujarati,
2003: 315).  Gujarati suggests that saving the residuals of such a regression will result in
seasonally-adjusted time-series.
The next step in investigating the time-series nature of the economic variables includes
the confirmation of the stationarity of the series.  For this, the unit root test is utilised.
Since time-series data have already been de-trended and de-seasonalised, the unit root
tests confirms the stationary nature of the time-series.  The results of the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test as used in unit root test are reported in table 2 in the appendix section.
After ensuring that the time-series are stationary, the study is modelled as ARMA
(AutoRegressive Moving Averages).  The idea stem from Box-Tiao’s (1975) intervention analysis.
This implies that by modelling through ARMA it is then possible to demonstrate if
elections in addition to the past history of each variable and the random error term can
provide explanation for the changes taking place in each policy instrument.  This process
requires the identification of ARMA benchmark models, for which parsimonious
representation of the exact data generating process that governs the residuals was
established.  Box-Jenkins methodology (1975) as reported by Gujarati (2003) suggests the
use of correlograms of the ACF (autocorrelation function) and of the PACF (partial
autocorrelation function)ξ. However, Gujarati (2003) and Enders (1995) further suggest
that in deciding the benchmark model, other processes (MA-Moving Averages and
ARMA and ARIMA-AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Averages) should be examined.
                                                 
ξ Enders (1995) and Gujarati (2003) provide the details of the process and guide the readers in a very clear
manner through each step.
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Using and examining ACF and PACF demonstrate that partial autocorrelations were zero
after one lag, which implies that the residuals of each variable are governed by a first-
order autoregressive process.
Following Gujarati’s advice (2003) to check the performance of other models, it was
found that AR(1) performs better than other ARMA processes.  This implies that in the
case of the economic time-series variables used in this study, AR(1) was utilised as the
most parsimonious benchmark model.
After identifying the benchmark model, the estimation of each variable is then carried
out by modelling each variable as univariate AR(1).  The electoral dummy variables
(ED1, ED2, ED3, ED4, ED5, TSLE and PREL) aimed at capturing the impact of
elections included separately into AR(1) model to find whether elections has any impact
on the econometric time-series utilised by this study in addition to each variable’s past
value and its respective error term.  Thus, the impact of elections is considered to be an
intervention or shock in the determination of the value of a variable by forcing the value
of the variable to shift during the intervention or shock periods.  The statistical
significance of the political dummy variables is tested by using t-test.  Consequently, if
the coefficient of the political dummy variable is statistically significant and possesses the
right sign it can be inferred that political manipulation exists and elections affected the
fiscal and monetary policy/and instrument time-series.  The estimation results are
depicted in the appendix section tables 3-11.
It should be added in the case of monetary policy variables that an additional modelling
strategy is followed.  It is a fact that changes in the monetary variables due to the election
stem from the use of fiscal policy for electoral purposes.  Therefore, in addition to
investigating the impact of each election variable, estimates are also carried out in the
case of controlling the impact of fiscal policy on monetary policy.  In other words, after
carrying out estimates for each monetary policy instrument as described above, then each
variable is fiscal policy adjusted.  The rationale for this stems from the fact that if fiscal
policy is used for electoral reasons, this imposes demand on the Central Bank.  Thus, the
objective is to find the consequences of the facilitatory attitude of the Central Bank by
transforming the election variables into interaction variables in terms of interaction
between monetary and fiscal policy in the election periods.  Since it is difficult to
differentiate fiscal policy as election oriented and non-election-oriented categories, the
interaction variable provides an approximation for such differentiation.  This interaction
variable simply requires the multiplication of the electoral variables with the fiscal policy
variable.  Thus, in the empirical analysis each of the defined election variables has a
prefix of FA denoting fiscal policy adjusted.  As a result, as Beck (1987: 210) predicts, it then
becomes possible to demonstrate if the Central Bank bent to the election oriented fiscal
policy demands of the incumbent government.  In the estimation, each of these
interaction variables are introduced individually into univariate AR(1) model to find the
monetary attitudes of Central Bank in relation to election oriented fiscal policy.
1.3.3. Data Specifications
Time-series data for fiscal and monetary variables for the post-1980 period were utilised.
It should be stated that the length of the data for each variable mostly varies due to the
available data.  As a developing country where the importance of provision of statistical
data has not been realised by the public sector agencies, it is rather difficult to assemble a
systematic data set.  However, every effort was put to reach as much quarterly and
monthly data as possible to ensure the robustness of the data.  Therefore, for
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government expenditures the data can mostly be found as far back as 1980.  However,
this is not true for the monetary variables, which are surprisingly provided by the Central
Bank.
It should be stated that the data were assembled from the electronic delivery system of
the Central Bank of Turkey (CBTR).
As regards to the election dates, depending on the availability of the data, maximum six
elections are covered: 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002.  The election dates and the
corresponding quarters are:
Election Date Quarter
6 November 1983 1983Q4
19 November 1987 1987Q4
20 October 1991 1991Q4
24 December 1995 1995Q4
18 April 1999 1999Q2
3 November 2002 2002Q4
1.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON NORDHAUS THEORETIC WITH FISCAL
POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE CASE OF TURKEY
The estimation procedure or strategy to find the impact of elections on fiscal policy
instruments is presented in the previous section.  This section aims to present the results
of the empirical analysis fiscal policy models.  The fiscal policy instruments presented in
this section are as follow;
i. Government Expenditure,
ii. Non-interest Government Expenditure,
iii. Transfers to State Economic Enterprises (SEEs),
iv. Public Investment.
1.4.1. Government Expenditures and Opportunistic PBC
In light of the specifications prescribed above, this is an attempt to model the quarterly
government expenditure for 1980Q1-2003Q1 within the Nordhaus model.  The
objective is to find if the election variables are significant and, thus, have any explanatory
power to explain the changes that take place in government expenditures.  The
econometric analysis in this section covers the period 1980Q-2003Q1, and therefore
analysis the impact of the 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 elections, a total of 6
general parliamentary elections.
The results of the analysis and tests are depicted in table 3 in the appendix section.  As
the autoregressive results in table 3 demonstrate, all pre-election election variables, ED1,
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ED2. ED3 and ED4 have positive signs, as expected, signalling increased government
expenditure before elections.  Accordingly, ED5, the post-election variable, which should
indicate decreases in government expenditure in the post election period to combat the
increased spending of the pre-election period to boost the likelihood of winning the
election for the incumbent government, produced a negative sign in compliance with the
prediction of the theory.
The t-statistical values of the electoral variables indicate the significance level of the
election variables.  According to the t-statistics depicted in table 3, ED3 and ED4 are not
statistically significant, while ED1 is statistically significant at 5% and ED2 and ED5 are
significant at 10% level of significance.  This implies that, after controlling for seasonal
and trend factors, government expenditure increases during the election quarter and one
quarter before the election quarter, which provides the government with a total of six
months to surf the economy through boosting its likelihood to win an election.
The additional election variables, TSLE and PREL, both have the expected signs and are
significant at 5% level of significance. This implies that the increasing number of quarters
alerts the incumbent government for the coming elections, and hence the probability of
elections increases.  This results in increases in government expenditure due to the high
probability of an approaching election.
The coefficient of the significant variables enables one to gauge the impact of elections.
Accordingly, ED1 implies that government expenditure is 1.6% higher than otherwise in
the election quarter, and the coefficient of ED2 states that government expenditure is
1.25% higher than otherwise in the quarter before the election and the election quarter.
By the same token, ED5 indicates that government expenditure declines by 1.2% in the
post-election period in comparison to the non-election month.
Consequently, as table 1 demonstrates, the significance of electoral variables ED1 and
ED2 provide evidence that incumbent governments in Turkey significantly increase their
expenditure in the election quarter and the preceding quarter.  The significance of ED5 is
again evidence of opportunistic business cycles, as it indicates decreases in government
expenditure after the election.  As the TSLE indicates, government expenditure in
relation to an election increases with the number of quarters that have elapsed since the
last election increases.  The results confirm that incumbent governments in Turkey, as
elsewhere, manipulate the economy through government expenditure, and hence create
opportunistic political business cycles.
1.4.2. Non-Interest Government Expenditures and Opportunistic PBC
Government expenditures are further examined by breaking down as non-interest
government expenditures.  In other words, government expenditure minus the interests
paid on debts is the subject of analysis in this section.  The reason for choosing non-
interest government expenditure is to isolate the impact of the huge interest payments
made on debts, and hence to have a better understanding of, and measure for, the
changes in government expenditure.
Due to the data limitation, the analysis in this section covers the period 1985Q-2003Q1,
and therefore analysis the impact of the 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 elections, a
total of 5 general parliamentary elections.
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The results are depicted in table 4 in the appendix section, where the estimation results
demonstrate that all the election variables have the expected signs.  However, ED1, the
election quarter, is not statistically significant, while the remaining electoral variables
demonstrate various degrees of statistical significance.  ED2 (one quarter prior to the
election quarter and the election quarter), and ED4 (three quarters prior to the election
and the election quarter) have positive signs as expected and are statistically significant at
10% level.  ED3 (two quarters before the election and the election quarter) indicates a
5% level of significance.  ED5 holds the expected negative sign, as it is predicted that
government expenditure should decrease for contracting the economy after election
period is over.  ED5 is also significant at 10% level of significance.  As before, TSLE and
PREL, the additional election variables are significant at 10%.  Since an increased
number of quarters from one election to another indicates a high probability of election,
as a result government expenditure increases.  Therefore, TSLE is significant and has
positive sign.  This confirms the significance of PREL as well, which indicates that with
the increasing quarters the probability of an election being called increases, which then
triggers the politically-manipulated fiscal policy with the opportunistic attitude of the
politicians.  The PBC is, hence, a result of this process.
The magnitude of the coefficients informs that the non-interest government
expenditures are higher in the election period than otherwise.  For instance, ED2
indicates that the non-interest government expenditure is 3.9% higher in the pre-election
quarter and the election quarter than is otherwise the case.   The coefficient of ED4
refers to 4.5% higher non-interest government expenditure than otherwise in the two
quarters before the election and the election quarter.
The evidence in this section provides support for the opportunistic PBC in non-interest
government expenditure.
1.4.3. Transfers to State Economic Enterprise and Opportunistic PBC
The real life experience as well as the analysis of the related data indicate that State
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) involved in the process of the manipulation of the
economy through, for instance, rises in agricultural purchasing prices during election
years, or the increased number of public sector employees in the election years.
Examples of SEEs involvement in the creation of election cycles are more visible or
observable during election periods.  This section is an attempt to analyse the impact of
elections on fund transfers made to SEEs from the consolidated budget.  The objective
is to demonstrate if elections can function as an additional explanatory factor in the trend
of time series of transfers to SEEs in addition to its past value.  In other words, this is an
attempt to find if there is an intervention in the course of the development transfers to
SEEs.
To fulfil this objective, quarterly data from 1985Q1 to 2003Q1 was analysed including
the 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 elections, a total of 5 general parliamentary
elections.
The results presented in table 5, which illustrate, except for ED1, all the other election
variables have the expected signs.  However, most of the election variables are
insignificant: ED1, ED2, ED5, TSLE and PREL.  Thus, only ED3 and ED4 are
statistically significant, which are respectively significant at 10% and 5%.  Although, ED5
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has the correct sign (-) as it is expected that the transfers to SEEs to decline after the
election, the results indicate it is not statistically significant.
The coefficients of the significant variables indicate the changes in the course of the
transfers to SEEs as a result of the election intervention.  The coefficient of ED3
indicates that transfers to SEEs is 2% higher than otherwise in the two quarters prior to
the election and the election quarter, while the coefficient of ED4 shows that transfers to
SEEs is 2.6% higher than normal in the three quarters prior to the elections.
As a result, in the case of transfers to SEEs, weak support is found for opportunistic
political business cycles.  It seems that only one quarter preceding the election and two
quarters preceding the elections, together with the election month, are significant.  This
implies that the incumbent government commences to increase transfers significantly 3-6
and 6-9 months before the elections, and hence does not leave it to the election quarter.
This is consistent with real-life experience.  Somehow most of the elections since 1983,
except for 1999 elections, have taken place in the final quarter of the year.  However, the
government declares the purchasing prices for the agricultural products of which one of
the SEEs is the biggest buyer.  This would only take place in spring, and a government,
which prepares discreetly for the coming election, would declare a high purchasing price.
This, then requires additional transfers of funds to the SEEs.
In conclusion, the weak results produced by the analysis in this section still indicate
consistency with real-life experiences, and hence are helpful in explaining the
opportunistic political business cycles created by incumbent governments to enhance
their chances of re-election.
1.4.4. Public Sector Investment Expenditures and Opportunistic PBC
It is observed that incumbent governments attempt to keep investments to the election
months, and start investment projects in the fields with huge ceremonies to exploit the
myopic nature of the electorate.  Therefore, investigating investment expenditure might
shed further light on the opportunistic use of fiscal policies for electoral success.
The data for government investment expenditures covers the period 1980Q1-2003Q1,
and hence this section analysis the impact of 6 parliamentary elections (1983, 1987, 1991,
1995, 1999 and 2002).
The autoregressive results are presented in table 6, which demonstrates, all the election
variables have the correct sign, and hence are consistent with the prediction of the
theory.  As expected ED5, the post-election dummy variable has a negative sign, which
implies that investment declines three quarters succeeding the election.
With regards the significance of each of the variables, ED1, the election quarter, and
ED2 the quarter before the election quarter and the election quarter are significant at
10%.    However, other election variables are not statistically significant.  The t-statistics
of ED3 and ED4 are very close to the 10% significance level and indicate a close
proximity for election manipulation in two quarters and three quarters pre-election
manipulation of government investment.  The post-election variable, ED5, has the same
significance level as PREL, but its significance is far from the acceptance level.   TSEL is
not significant in the case of public investment expenditures.
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The results, as analysed, indicate a certain degree of support for the opportunistic PBC in
the case of investments from the consolidated budget.  In particular the coefficient of
ED1 implies that during election quarters investment is 5.1% higher than otherwise, and
in the quarter preceding the election and the election quarter, government investment is
greater by 53% than otherwise.  These directly refer to opportunistic government
investment cycles created by the incumbent government to boost its chance of re-
election.
The analyses provide satisfactory evidence to conclude that governments increase public
investment during the six months prior to elections to exploit the myopic nature of the
voters in its attempt to increase its popularity and its likelihood of re-election.  In
conclusion, the analysis provides evidence for the presence of PBC in government
investment during the six election periods from 1980Q1 to 2003Q1.
1.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON NORDHAUS THEORETIC WITH
MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS
This section furthers the analysis to examine the case for monetary policy instruments.  If
the government intervenes and changes the course of fiscal policy in its favour, this can
only be achieved in relation to monetary policy.  In doing so, this section will analyse the
following monetary policy instruments in accordance with the above presented
theoretical and empirical specifications:
i. Money in circulation,
ii. M1,
iii. M2Y,
iv. Domestic credit,
v. Consumer price index, or inflation.
1.5.1. Money in Circulation and Opportunistic PBC
Since elections take place with large campaigns it is normal that ‘money in circulation’
(MIC) increases during an election period.  However, the preceding analyses of fiscal
policy instruments indicate that governments in the past have exploited fiscal policy for
electoral profiteering or to boost their chances of re-election.  This inevitably involves
the use of money.  The result expected from this is the manipulation of monetary
variables, which involves increasing the amount of money injected into the economy.
Thus, it has two aspects: injection of money into the economy due to election campaigns,
and secondly the use of fiscal policy necessitates the injection of additional monies into
the economy.
The data in this section covers the 1986Q1-2002Q3period, and hence the 1987, 1991,
1995, and 1999 elections.  Table 7 depicts the detailed results of the autoregressive
modelling.  All the election variables have the correct and expected signs.  The electoral
variable, ED5 has a negative sign as expected.  In addition, except for ED3 and ED4 all
other election variables are statistically significant.  While ED1, ED2 and TSLE are
significant at 10%, ED5 and PREL are significant at 5%.
The signs and the significance of most of the election variables indicates the existence of
the opportunistic PBC in the 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 elections in Turkey
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through the use of the monetary variable, money in circulation.  The significance of ED1
and ED2 demonstrates that governments commenced the injection of additional money
into the economy for election purposes from the quarter before the election quarter and
continued to so during election quarters.    The coefficient of ED1 implies that money in
circulation is about 4% greater in the election quarters than otherwise, whereas in the
quarter before the election quarter it was about 3.4% greater than otherwise.  The
significance of ED5, the post-electoral variable, indicates that governments pursue
contractionary economic policies after the election by decreasing the money levels in the
economy.
The significance of additional election variables enhances the robustness of the results.
Since TSLE is significant, it can be interpreted that the increasing quarters from the last
election increase the probability of calling an election, which in turn indicates the
increased injection of money into the economy by the Central Bank to meet the
government’s demand of high spending for electoral purposes.
The analysis concludes that governments manipulate the ‘money in circulation’ prior to
an election to enhance its chances of re-election or simply to buy votes.
1.5.2. Monetary Instrument M1 and Opportunistic PBC
After establishing that governments have in the past initiated increasing money
circulation in the economy or the money base during and pre-election quarters, this
section aims to investigate the developments in M1 vis-à-vis elections and government
manipulation.
The data for M1, which cover 1986Q1-2002Q3, and thus covers the 1987, 1991, 1995,
and 1999 elections.
The results are presented in table 8, where the results demonstrate that except for the
additional election variable, all the election variables have the correct signs including
post-election variable ED5, which has a negative sign.
With regards to the significance of the variables, except for ED1, ED2 and ED5, all
other variables are insignificant.  ED1, ED2 and ED5 are all significant at 10%.  This
implies that the government manipulates M1 as a monetary instrument in the quarter
prior to the election and in the election quarter.  In these quarters, as the coefficients of
the respective variables indicate, M1 is 2.5% higher than otherwise in the election quarter
and 4.2% higher than otherwise in the quarter prior to elections.  The decline in M1 in
the post election quarters, as indicated by ED5, is 2.8% higher than otherwise.
While it is true that other election variables did not produce any significant support for
the use of M1 for electoral purposes, the evidence provided by ED1, ED2 and ED5 is
sufficient enough to conclude that governments initiate increasing M1 money levels in
the economy in the six months prior to the election.  In other words, the evidence is
sufficient enough to conclude that the government opportunistically uses M1 to buy
votes or enhance their chances of winning the approaching election, thereby contribute
to the creation of PBC in the economy.  The cycle is unambiguous in the performance of
the significant electoral variables, as ED1 and ED2 indicate increased M1 through
election intervention, but ED5 indicates the decline in M1 in the post-election quarters.
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1.5.3. Monetary Instrument M2Y and Opportunistic PBC
To complete the analysis of electoral use of monetary instruments, M2Y is used to
investigate the opportunistic business cycle in Turkey for the period 1986Q1-2002Q3
covering 1987, 1991, 1995, and 1999 elections.
The detailed results of the analysis can be found in table 9, which demonstrates that all
electoral variables have the expected signs, which included ED5, the post-election
variable.  In addition, all election variables, except for ED4, are significant in various
significance levels.  ED1, ED2, ED5 are significant at 5%, while ED3, TSLE and PREL
are significant at 10%.
The significance of electoral variables confirms the results produced in the previous
sections by other monetary variables.  Accordingly, it can be stated that governments
from 1986Q1 to 2002Q3, including the 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 elections,
opportunistically used M2Y as part of their manufacturing of PBC in the case of Turkey.
The results indicate that three quarters prior to the election including the election quarter
the government is involved in surfing the economy in an interventionist manner by
shifting levels of M2Y.  This is evidenced from the coefficients of the electoral variables.
For example, the coefficients of ED1 and ED2 demonstrate that due to elections M2Y is
about 2.8% higher than otherwise, and ED5, the post-election variable, indicates that
M2Y is 2.1% lesser than otherwise.  These results provide evidence for monetary PBC.
The right signs of TSLE and PREL and their significance level confirm the robust
analysis results.  TSLE demonstrates that due to the increasing quarters from the last
election, the M2Y is higher by around 7% than otherwise.  Again since increasing
number of quarters from the last election period increases the probability of elections to
be called, the coefficient of PREL indicates that M2Y is 2% higher than otherwise.
It can therefore be concluded that intervention analysis sheds light on the understanding
of the use of M2Y for electoral purposes by past governments in Turkey.  The results
confirm that such a political attitude functions from nine months prior to the election, or
two quarters and the election quarter.  The results of TSLE and PREL support this.  The
results in general support the hypothesis of government use of monetary policies for
electoral success purposes or buying votes to ensure their return to office after the
election.
1.5.4. Domestic Credits and Opportunistic PBC
The Central Bank of Turkey provides domestic credits to public sector agencies and in
particular to the SEEs.  The rationale for utilising the domestic credits in the search for
PBC is thus due to the fact that the public sector agencies and the SEEs may require
short-term credits from the Central Bank to accommodate the government’s attempts to
manufacture a policy cycle in the country to boost its chances for re-election.
The data in this section covers 1986Q1 to 2002Q3, and thus covers the 1987, 1991, 1995
and 1999 elections by missing the election quarter of the 2002 election.  It still covers the
two quarters preceding the 2002 election.
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The results of the autoregressive analysis are presented in table 10, which demonstrates,
all the election variables have the right signs, including the post-election dummy variable
ED5.  Among the pre-election variables only ED1 and ED4 are statistically significant at
10% level of significance.  ED2 and ED3 fail to pass the significance test.  ED5, the
post-electoral variable performed better than the others and is significant at 5%.
Additional election variables TSEL and PREL are both significant at 10%.
The results indicate that the Central Bank accommodates the fund needs of public sector
agencies by providing domestic credits in the election periods.  The significance of ED1
indicates that domestic credits increase in the election quarter, and three quarters prior to
elections as indicated by ED4.  The coefficients of these variables, respectively, imply
that domestic credits are 1.5% higher in the election quarter than otherwise and 1.65%
higher in the three quarters preceding the election quarter than otherwise.  This shows
the impact of elections as a variable on domestic credits, and how the incumbent
government uses it opportunistically.
The significance of the post-election variable ED5 indicates the closure of the cycle
created in domestic credits, as the coefficient of the variable indicates that decline in
domestic credit is 2.4% higher than normal.  Thus, the government’s attempt to contract
the economy after the election impacts domestic credits as well.
The additional electoral variables enhance the strength of the equation despite the fact
that ED2 and ED3 is not statistically significant.  The significance of TSEL indicates that
the longer the period from the last election, the higher the government’s motive to
manipulate domestic credits, albeit the coefficient of the TSEL is rather low.  PREL
indicates how the increasing probability of the coming elections induces governments to
manipulate the economy, as it seems that such a probability results in the government
increasing domestic credits by 52% than otherwise.
The results provided by the autoregressive analysis of the domestic credits provide
further evidence and support for the presence of politically-manufactured cycles in
economic variables, or the creation of PBC in this case through the use of domestic
credits.
1.5.5. Inflation and Opportunistic PBC
High inflation has become the norm in economic life in since the early 1970s in Turkey.
Therefore unless there is a dramatic change in inflation, the developments in inflation do
not make much news either.  This is the same with unemployment.  However, people
somehow still keep their reactions against inflation, which may result in pocket-money
oriented voting.
The rationale for including inflation in this analysis is due to the fact the SEEs produce
and distribute important consumption goods and services.  In a very highly inflationary
environment, they do increase their prices regularly, which is usually broadcast on news
media.  However, election periods cause great sensitivity on the side of the government
to keep quiet about price increases by deferring them to the post-election period.  Thus,
after each election it is common to hear opposition parties accuse the returned party for
using the myopic characteristic of voters to boost their probability of winning the
election.  However, if the incumbent party losses the election, despite deferring price
increases, then the winning party would again accuse the former incumbent party for
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leaving a huge economic burden by not increasing the prices of SEEs produced and
distributed goods, as this has to be fulfilled by the new government who would
immediately receive a negative point in its honeymoon period.  Thus, inflation or price
increases seem to be a rich field to look for opportunistically created business cycles in
the country.  It should be noted that the data for this period cover 1987Q1 to 2003Q1,
and hence includes in its analysis the 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 elections.
The results are depicted in table 11, which demonstrates all the election variables have
the expected signs: pre-election variables have negative signs as expected, which is due to
the fact that governments attempt to create low inflation or price increase periods prior
to an election.  Accordingly, post-election variables have positive signs, as inflation is
expected to increase after the election due to the deferred price increases, as well as due
to the general impact of the manipulation of the economy.
With regards to the statistical significance of the variables, table 9 demonstrates that only
the ED1 election variable is statistically significant at 10%.  Electoral variable ED4 is
insignificant only at the margin, and therefore there is an indication towards statistical
significance in ED4.  As regards the impact of the election on ED1, it seems that
inflation is around 3.8% lower in the election quarter than otherwise.
Having only one election variable to be significant does not undermine the robustness of
the analysis.  On the contrary, the results provide evidence that the government attempts
to control inflation or price increases in the election quarter with the understanding that
voters are myopic and would only remember the last months or quarters.  In addition, as
regards to inflation, the realities of the country have to be taken into account.  Living in
conditions of high inflation does not facilitate the deferral of price increases, as prices
should be adjusted continuously.  Otherwise, when the price increase is not reflected but
kept and financed by the government, it may encounter a much greater economic
problem.  As a result, the government cannot defer price increases in the long-run and
therefore they must confine their opportunistic manipulation of inflation only in one
quarter, namely the election quarter.
1.6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON NORDHAUS THEORETIC WITH
MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS INTERACTING WITH FISCAL
POLICY
The previous two sections have independently focused on fiscal and monetary policy
instruments in investigating the existence of PBC in Turkey in various election periods.
As mentioned, governments most of the time use fiscal policy instruments in their
attempt to boost the economy for their electoral success.  The case for fiscal policy
instruments is presented above, and the analysis indicates that Turkish governments in
the past have used electoral variables for their private ends.  The monetary policy
instruments provided the same kind of conclusion as well.  However, it is a fact, as
mentioned previously, that the use of fiscal policy instruments requires the
accommodation of such demands by the Central Bank.  Thus, fiscal policy instruments
create additional impact or intervention on monetary policy variables.  Therefore, this
section aims to analyse such an interaction in a more focused way.  The previous sections
provide enough evidence to establish such a link, but it is also important to directly or
systematically investigate the interaction or the impact of fiscal policy manipulation on
monetary policy due to elections.
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For this objective, each electoral variable was interacted or multiplied with government
expenditure, and the same econometrics time-series investigation was carried out.  The
new election variables have the FA (fiscal policy adjusted) prefixes.
The autoregressive, AR(1), results are reported in table 12, where the figures in brackets
are t-statistics.  The data covers the period 1986Q1 to 2002Q3, and hence includes the
interventions of the 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections and the pre-election period of
the 2002 elections.
Table 12 demonstrates that the Central Bank of Turkey facilitated the incumbent
governments’ demands by accommodating the election-oriented fiscal policy
manipulations.
In analysing the results, it is obvious that in the case of Money in Circulation all the
electoral variables have the expected signs.  As can be seen from table 10, FAED1,
FAED2, FAEDTSLE and FAEDPRLE are significant, respectively at 5%, 10%, 10%
and 5% significance level.  The post-electoral variable FAED5 is insignificant at the 10%
margin, but in any case the magnitude of the coefficient is very low.  All other significant
election variables indicate that the Central Bank increases the money in circulation in the
election quarter and previous quarters to accommodate the financing of increased
government expenditure, as the money in circulation in the election quarter and the
previous quarters is around 1.4% higher than otherwise.  Additional interactive variables,
FAEDTSLE and FEADPRLE provide further strength to the results, indicating the
impact of time since the last election and hence the probability of the approaching
election increases the money in circulation due to the increases in government
expenditure.
As regards the monetary variable, M1, the results demonstrate that interacted electoral
variables all have the expected signs.  However, only FAED1, FAED2, FAEDTSLE and
FAEDPREL are significant at 10%.   This implies that the Central Bank commences to
accommodate the demands from the incumbent government around six months prior to
the election.  For instance, in the election quarter, M1 is 3% higher than otherwise.  In
concluding, the results provide evidence for the central bank’s accommodatory policies
in M1 for the incumbent government’s election-oriented expansionary policies.
The development in M2Y in relation to fiscal policy interacted election variables
produced stronger results, as all electoral variables are statistically significant at 5% except
FAED3 and FAEDPREL, at 10% level.  Thus, the results evidence that the Central Bank
accommodates fiscal policy throughout the election year, as all the fiscal policy interacted
election variables, which extends to the entire year, are all significant.  The significance of
additional fiscal policy interacted election variables determines the inclination of the
Central Bank towards accommodating the expansionary fiscal policy.  The post-election
election variable is significant as well, as it indicates the decrease in the M2Y in the post-
election quarters, as it seems that in the post election quarters the M2Y is 1.82% lesser
than otherwise.
The coefficient of the fiscal policy interacted election variables indicate that M2Y is
higher between 1.65% (in the election quarter) to 2.76% (three quarters prior to the
election) than otherwise.  Thus, the impact of an election is established yet again.
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1.7. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to analyse the presence of politically manufactured business cycles or
political business cycles in Turkey.  So doing, it has adapted the Nordhaus model (1975)
and attempted to model the Turkish case with fiscal and monetary policy instruments in
the post-1980 period.  The main understanding of the model is that governments pursue
opportunistic fiscal and monetary policies to stir the economy in the pre-election period
by boosting the economy to improve its chances of re-election.  However, following the
election, the government attempts to contain the impact of pre-election expansionary
policies and attempts to contract the economy.  It is important to note that the model
assumes that voters are myopic, and hence vulnerable to manipulation and affected by
positive developments in the pre-election period.
The empirical results are presented in three sections.  The first empirical section analysed
four fiscal policy instruments in relation to elections: government expenditure, non-
interest government expenditure, transfers to SEEs and public sector investment.  The
second section presented the empirical results for the monetary policy instruments,
which are money in circulation, M1, M2Y, domestic credits and consumer price index.
The third empirical section presented the results for fiscal and monetary policy
interaction, and analysed the impact of elections on monetary policy through the
intervention or effect of the fiscal policy to find out the attitude of the Central Bank
towards the fiscal demands of the incumbent government.
Table 13 brings together the main results of the analysis involving the policy instruments,
the period coverage of data and the table where the results are depicted.  It provides
detailed information by identifying each statistically significant variable for each policy
instrument and in the end provides a conclusion.
As the summary information in table 13 demonstrates, out of 12 models, one of them
yielded very strong support for the opportunistic business cycles in Turkey.  This is the
fiscal policy adjusted/interacted monetary policy instrument, M2Y, in which five
variables are significant at 5% and two of them at 10%.  Five model performed strongly as
six variables in Non-interest Government Expenditure model and M2Y model, and five
variables Government Expenditure model, Money in Circulation model and Domestic
Credit models are statistically significant. Government Expenditure, Money in
Circulation and Domestic Credits models.  Money in Circulation Fiscal Policy Interacted
and M1 Fiscal Policy Interacted models are moderately strong, as in each four electoral
variables are statistically significant.
M1 model as a monetary policy instrument demonstrated a relatively strong performance
as in the model only three variables are statistically significant.  Transfers to SEEs and
Government Investment models produced relatively weak results with merely two
statistically significant variables.  It should, however, be noted that in the Public
Investment model two more variables could be statistically significant as they were
rejected at the margin.  The Inflation or Consumer Price Index model yielded weak
result, as only one election variable is statistically significant.
The statistically significant election variables refer to different quarter periods.  Except
for the Transfers to SEEs and Public Investment models, in all the models ED1 or the
election quarter is statistically significant which indicates the presence of the
opportunistic PBC in the election quarter in the remaining nine models.  The post-
election variable ED5 has performed well, but failed to be significant in four models
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(Transfers to SEEs, Public Investment, and fiscal policy adjusted models of Money in
Circulation and M1).  Other election variables, as previously analysed, indicate one
quarter, two quarters, and three quarters pre-election opportunistic PBC or the
politically-manufactured business cycles in each of the mentioned variables.  It can thus
be confidently argued that elections as intervention creates additional impact on fiscal
and monetary variables by moving the instrument from its course through the
manipulative policies of the incumbent government to enhance its re-election likelihood.
Table 13. Summary of the Results
Policy Instrument
/or Outcomes
Data
Range
Location
of Results
Significant
Electoral Variables
Conclusion
Government
Expenditures
1980Q1-
2003Q1
Table 3 ED1a; ED2b; ED5b;
TSLEa;  and PRELa
Strong
Non-Interest
Government
Expenditures
1985Q1-
2003Q1
Table 4 ED2b; ED3a; ED4b;
ED5b; TSLEb; and
PRELb
Strong
Transfers to
SEEs
1985Q1-
2003Q1
Table 5 ED3b and ED4a Relatively Weak
Public Sector
Investment
1981Q1-
2003Q1
Table 6 ED1b and ED2b
(ED3c and ED4c)
Relatively Weak
Money in
Circulation
1986Q1-
2002Q3
Table 7 ED1b; ED2b; ED5a;
TSLEb; and PRELa
Strong
M1 1986Q1-
2002Q3
Table 8 ED1b; ED2b and
ED5b
Relatively
Strong
M2Y 1986Q1-
2002Q3
Table 9 ED1a; ED2a; ED3b;
ED5a; TSLEb and
PRELb
Strong
Domestic Credits 1986Q1-
2002Q3
Table 10 ED1b; ED4b; ED5a;
TSLEb and PRELb
Strong
Consumer Price
Index
1987Q1-
2003Q1
Table 11 ED1b Weak
Monetary and
Fiscal Policy
Interaction
1986Q1-
2002Q3
Table 12 MIC: FAED1a;
FAED2b;
FAEDTSLEb and
FAEDPRLEa;
M1: FAED1b;
FAED2b;
FAEDTSLEb; and
FAEDPRELb;
M2Y: all variablesa
except for FAED3b
and FAEDPRELb
MIC:
Moderately
Strong;
M1: Moderately
Strong
M2Y: Very
Strong
Notes: (a) indicates 5% significance level; (b) stands for 10% significance level; (c) could be
significant at the margins of 10% significance level
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It should be noted that the results have generally been better than what was expected at
the beginning of the study, as they provide strong evidence for the opportunistic
Nordhaus type political business cycles in Turkey.  Therefore, it can be argued with the
evidence that incumbent governments are involved in election-oriented fiscal and
monetary policy-making for winning the approaching elections. They commence such
policies sometimes around nine-to-twelve months prior to an election as the significance
of ED4 indicates in some of the models.  This implies the allocation of resources for
unproductive purposes, as governments give way to populist policies.  Therefore, during
election years the stabilisation policies arranged in collaboration with the IMF have
always given up for the sake of populist policies to buy votes to remain in power.  As
before each election governments have always expanded the economy through
government expenditure and through injecting money into the economy.  Although this
study indicates the contraction of the economy after elections in certain cases, the
realities of Turkey do not always allow that and the heat of the economy continues from
one cycle and crisis to another.  It seems that Nordhaus’ (1975) prediction for the long-
run is vindicated in Turkey, as from one election to another the economy keeps moving
away from converging to the equilibrium, and hence optimality is lost forever in the
economy.
With the analysis presented, theoretisation of the experience of what one observes in the
field has been made possible. The econometric analysis in this study contributes to the
understanding developed through experience by providing concrete and systematic
evidence to support real life intuition or observation.  It can therefore be concluded that,
as evidenced by the analyses presented in this study opportunistic PBC have existed
during elections in Turkey in the post-1980 period.
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 APPENDIX TABLES
Table 1. Degrees of Polynomial Deterministic Time Trend
Policy Instruments The degree of deterministic
polynomial time-trends
Government Expenditures First-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
Non-Interest Government
Expenditures
Sixth degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
Transfers to SEEs First-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
Public Sector Investment First-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
Money in Circulation First-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
M1 Sixth-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
M2Y Fifth-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
Domestic Credits Sixth-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
Consumer Price Index Sixth-degree polynomial deterministic
time trend
Table 2. Unit Root Test Results
Policy Instruments ADF Test 95% critical value for
the ADF statistic
Government Expenditures -3.6071 -2.8929
Non-Interest Government
Expenditures
- 6.2600 - 2.9048
Transfers to SEEs - 6.7649 - 2.9017
Public Sector Investment - 7.0991 - 2.8929
Money in Circulation - 4.0148 - 2.9062
M1 - 5.8669 - 2.9055
M2Y - 7.1377 - 2.9077
Domestic Credits - 3.4236 - 2.9055
Consumer Price Index - 6.6385 - 2.9069
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Table 3. Seasonally and Trend Adjusted Government Expenditure, 1980Q1-2003Q1
Dependent Variable: Logged Government Expenditures (LGEXP)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coef
f.
t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. 0.125
7
0.475 0.12439 0.4773 0.1292
3
0.500 0.1282 0.495 0.13836 0.5376 0.0906 0.3524 0.1604 0.6228
LGEXP(1) 0.489 13.288 0.4957 13.203 0.5012 13.481 0.4993 13.493 0.4936 13.353 0.4897
2
12.947 0.490 13.072
ED1 0.164
1
2.039
ED2 0.1259 1.7520
ED3 0.0378 0.4655
ED4 0.0139 0.1726
ED5 -0.1217 -1.854
TSLE 0.0157 2.3880
PREL 0.582 2.1562
Diagnostic Tests
R2 0.659 0.6527 0.64381 0.64301 0.65137 0.66485 0.66093
AIC -7.0294 -7.8900 -9.02227 -9.1193 -8.0423 -6.2460 -6.7736
SBC -12.0511 -12.9117 -14.0444 -14.1410 -13.0641 -11.2677 -11.7954
F-stat. 56.102 54.5006 52.4169 52.1193 54.1827 57.5288 56.5290
DW 2.204 2.2139 2.2262 2.2324 2.2217 2.1762 2.1832
Notes: R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion;
F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
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Table 4. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted Non-Interest Government Expenditure, 1985Q1-2003Q1
Dependent Variable: Logged Non-Interest Government Expenditure (LNINGEXP)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. -0.0057 -0.029 -0.0048 -0.1892 -0.00867 -0.03313 -0.0054 -0.209 0.0086 0.348 -0.0307 -0.995 0.030 1.0028
LNINGEXP(1) 0.4919 12.9243 0.5011 13.2505 0.495 13.481 0.4965 12.897 0.49397 12.962 0.49880 13.2041 0.4974 13.1400
ED1 0.0145 0.5954
ED2 0.03891 1.7596
ED3 0.0455 1.999
ED4 0.0216 1.8937
ED5 -0.0424 -1.759
TSLE 0.00036 1.7308
PREL 0.1359 1.7556
Diagnostic Tests
R2 0.68 0.692 0.697 0.68 0.693 0.693 0.6936
AIC 90.57 91.8068 92.42 90.84 91.984 91.93 91.97
SBC 86.01 87.25 87.86 86.29 87.4313 87.37 87.42
F-stat 48.88 50.98 52.278 49.032 51.314 51.239 51.32
DW 2.268 2.320 2.205 2.237 2.174 2.234 1.992
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
Mehmet Asutay Searching for Opportunistic PBC in Turkey
28
Table 5. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted Transfers to SEEs, 1985Q1-2003Q1
Dependent Variable: Logged Transfers to SEEs (LTSEE)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. 0.007 0.076 -0.010 -0.111 -0.0363 -0.3865 -0.064 -0.638 0.0186 0.1955 -0.070 -0.526 0.0878 0.6713
LTSEE(1) 0.510 10.481 0.516 10.624 0.51333 10.8243 0.5204 11.249 0.5110 10.551 0.513 10.692 0.5135 10.733
ED1 -0.036 -0.269
ED2 0.1164 0.908
ED3 0.2055 1.7096
ED4 0.2637 2.2799
ED5 -0.0729 -0.5717
TSLE 0.0088 0.797
PREL 0.379 0.933
Diagnostic Test
R2 0.59246 0.59695 0.60888 0.62067 0.59400 0.59579 0.59712
AIC -27.6943 -27.2988 -26.2212 -25.1435 -27.5608 -27.4156 -27.3002
SBC -32.2477 -31.8521 -30.7745 -29.6968 -32.1142 -31.9689 -31.8536
F-stat 32.9522 33.5708 35.2867 37.0875 33.1624 33.498 33.5948
DW 1.8321 1.9243 1.8847 2.0239 1.9384 1.8137 1.8749
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
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Table 6. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted Public Sector Investment Expenditure, 1980Q1-2003Q1
Dependent Variable: Logged Public Investment Expenditure (LPSINV)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. 0.0171 0.179 0.0204 0.2131 0.0218 0.2263 0.0254 0.261 0.0075 0.0814 0.0738 0.661 0.0654 0.600
LPSINV(1) 0.533 14.278 0.5349 14.408 0.53342 14.2043 0.5355 14.430 0.529 14.1858 0.5327 14.284 0.5309 14.2522
ED1 0.051 1.718
ED2 0.5364 1.8627
ED3 0.040 1.5027
ED4 0.0468 1.595
ED5 -1.113 -1.366
TSLE 0.0063 0.9628
PREL 0.3618 1.3430
R2 0.70312 0.703 0.702 0.703 0.707 0.7048 0.70777
AIC -5.2445 -5.2155 -5.3122 -5.2590 -4.4820 -4.9625 -4.5126
SBC -10.266 -10.2372 -10.339 -10.2808 -9.5037 -9.9843 -9.5343
F-stat 68.6820 68.747 68.5382 68.6520 70.299 69.2669 70.2386
DW 2.0285 1.9314 1.9314 1.9120 1.9613 1.9926 1.8281
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
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Table 7. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted Money in Circulation, 1986Q1-2002Q3
Dependent Variable: Logged Money in Circulation (LMIC)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. 0.004 0.914 0.0081 0.175 -0.0018 -0.037 0.0016 0.0351 0.001 0.0220 0.0036 0.071 0.0016 0.033
LMIC(1) 0.515 11.100 0.487 10.008 0.5069 10.655 0.5065 10.593 0.5067 10.603 0.5062 10.583 0.5064 10.579
ED1 0.0454 1.899
ED2 0.034 1.892
ED3 0.0142 0.625
ED4 0.0004 0.0188
ED5 -0.0487 -2.2003
TSLE 0.0260 1.9088
PREL 0.0802 1.9953
Diagnostic Tests
R2 0.74892 0.74329 0.73569 0.73391 0.7340 0.733 0.73390
AIC 85.3742 84.6820 83.7230 85.5172 83.5383 83.5214 83.5171
SBC 81.3742 80.3332 79.3742 79.1684 79.1895 79.1726 79.1683
F-stat 60.6507 58.8731 56.5972 56.0807 56.1365 56.0947 56.0804
DW 2.0599 2.2673 1.9911 2.1428 1.9328 1.9383 1.9416
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
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Table 8. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted M1, 1986Q1-2002Q3
Dependent Variable: Logged M1 (LM1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. 0.0008 0.0593 0.0003 0.0027 -0.00245 -0.1609 0.0031
1
0.2091 0.0050 0.37376 -0.013 -0.644 0.0124 0.6705
LM1(1) 0.4971 9.013 0.4977 8.7345 0.5001 9.0703 0.4988 9.0466 0.5089 9.1914 0.5052 9.1421 0.5056 9.1457
ED1 0.0251 1.7686
ED2 0.04256 1.814
ED3 0.00783 0.4290
ED4 0.1024 0.5817
ED5 -0.0283 -1.6950
TSLE 0.0014 0.8878
PREL -0.0611 -0.9893
Diagnostic Tests
R2 0.5856 0.57689 0.57789 0.57750 0.5888 0.58053 0.58172
AIC 101.7519 101.0522 101.1171 103.2235 104.1435 103.4609 103.5580
SBC 97.4032 96.7035 96.7684 98.8442 99.7642 99.0815 99.1787
F-stat 28.7639 27.7239 27.8374 28.2490 29.6023 28.6024 28.7418
DW 1.9629 1.8408 1.9450 1.9436 1.9053 1.9795 1.9564
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
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Table 9. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted M2Y, 1986Q1-2002Q3
Dependent Variable: Logged LM2Y
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. -0.362 -0.021 -0.0018 -0.1066 0.00228 0.1339 0.0050 0.2874 0.0003 0.02298 -0.006 -0.3356 0.0053 0.2751
LM2Y(1) 0.4960 6.4012 0.48978 6.4215 0.49696 6.4259 0.4791 6.2683 0.4909 6.3651 0.4925 6.4190 0.4922 6.4090
ED1 0.0281 2.099
ED2 0.011 2.1415
ED3 0.0289 1.7232
ED4 0.0157 1.1031
ED5 -0.0217 -2.1152
TSLE 0.0783 1.7784
PREL 0.0206 1.8182
Diagnostic Tests
R2 0.61690 0.61922 0.61770 0.62310 0.61531 0.61740 0.61695
AIC 112.1326 112.3189 112.1989 112.6359 112.0044 112.1762 112.1409
SBC 107.8463 0.039233 107.9126 108.3496 107.7181 107.8899 107.8546
F-stat 31.6687 31.9819 31.7760 32.5132 31.4574 31.7361 31.6761
DW 2.1791 2.0892 2.1750 2.0734 1.9551 2.1453 2.0476
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
Mehmet Asutay Searching for Opportunistic PBC in Turkey
33
Table 10. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted Domestic Credits, 1986Q1-2002Q3
Dependent Variable: Logged Domestic Credits (LDC)
Model 1:ED1 Model 2: ED2 Model 3: ED3 Model 4: ED4 Model 5:ED5 Model 6: TSEL Model 7: PREL
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. -.00365 -0.305 -0.0013 -0.0655 -0.0004 -0.022 -0.0074 -0.6139 0.0016 0.1383 -0.014 -1.007 0.0081 0.5899
LDC(1) 0.5044 10.8774 0.52078 7.0974 0.52520 7.2547 0.5071 10.889 0.4990 10.9408 0.4949 10.4635 0.4946 10.4500
ED1 .01536 1.7205
ED2 0.0048 0.34152
ED3 0.69543 0.010
ED4 0.0165 1.7035
ED5 -0.0240 -2.2109
TSLE 0.0013 1.9245
PREL 0.5262 1.7790
Diagnostic Tests
R2 0.80303 0.69602 0.69543 0.80186 0.80884 0.80013 0.80061
AIC 132.5421 119.7009 119.6390 132.3462 133.5190 132.0723 132.1583
SBC 127.069 115.3216 115.2597 126.8721 128.0449 126.5982 126.6842
F-stat 62.1724 47.3201 47.1892 61.7170 64.5251 61.0488 61.2328
DW 1.9357 1.9471 2.0598 2.1915 1.9755 1.9100 1.8131
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
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Table 11. Autoregressive Seasonally and Trend Adjusted Consumer Price Index, 1987Q1-2003Q1
Dependent Variable: Logged Consumer Price Index (LCPI)
Model 1:ED1 Model 2: ED2 Model 3: ED3 Model 4: ED4 Model 5:ED5 Model 6: TSEL Model 7: PREL
Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis. Coeff. t-statis.
Cons. -0.0016 -0.028 -0.0058 0.1006 0.005 0.8378 0.0183 0.2929 -0.0058 -0.0965 0.0012 0.01632 -0.004 -0.054
LCPI(1) 0.5034 11.3735 0.50123 11.4419 0.5019 11.3882 0.5051 11.627 0.50127 11.3624 0.5011 11.3850 0.5011 11.3697
ED1 -0.0387 -1.976
ED2 -0.069 -0.9873
ED3 -0.0390 -0.5505
ED4 -0.075 -1.1794
ED5 0.00522 0.07289
TSLE -0.007 -0.1161
PREL -0.0014 -0.0061
Diagnostic Tests
R2 0.63019 0.63446 0.63039 0.63704 0.62861 0.62867 0.62857
AIC 12.3293 12.7025 1.8258 12.9155 12.1902 12.1944 12.1874
SBC 8.0115 8.3847 8.0302 8.5973 7.8725 7.8767 7.8697
F-stat 34.0812 34.7137 34.1108 35.1022 33.8512 33.8605 33.8455
DW 1.8256 1.9499 1.8258 1.8721 1.9277 1.9261 1.9256
Notes: Coeff.: Coefficient; t-statis: t-statistics; R2: Coefficient of Determination (Goodness of Fit); AIC: Akaike Information Criterion;
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; F-stat.: F-Distribution Test; DW: Durbin-Watson d Statistics
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Table 12. Autoregressive Results for Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction
Money in
Circulation
M1 M2Y
FAED1 0.0146
(2.2346)
R2=0.75410
DW=1.7874
0.030901
(1.6685)
R2=0.63988
DW=1.8459
0.16582
(2.2789)
R2=0.5376
DW=1.7803
FAED2 0.0138
(1.739)
R2=0.73390
DW=1.7455
0.009690
(1.69765)
R2=0.63535
DW=1.8653
0.21439
(1.8760)
R2=0.5347
DW=1.753
FAED3 0.0098
(0.004338)
R2=0.7290
DW=1.7422
0.004590
(0.10627)
R2=0.63493
DW=1.8650
0.01927
(1.9685)
R2=0.4982
DW=1.752
FAED4 0.002814
(0.5459)
R2=0.73487
DW=1.7566
0.002440
(0.60109)
R2=0.63484
DW=1.8659
0.27692
(2.0128)
R2=0.5129
DW=1.785
FAED5 -0.009335
(-1.0227)
R2=0.73840
DW=1.6874
-0.002101
(0.28580)
R2=0.57718
DW=1.7466
-0.1829
(-2.3769)
R2=0.4865
DW=1.788
FAEDTSLE 0.0160
(1.9882)
R2=0.73386
DW=1.7457
0.020042
(1.78077)
R2=0.57962
DW=1.7413
0.2789
(2.3678)
R2=0.4741
DW=1.7887
FEADPRLE 0.01402
(3.1984)
R2=0.77089
DW=1.6788
0.002632
(1.8995)
R2=0.58522
DW=1.7389
0.2768
(1.7979)
R2=0.4829
DW=1.752
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